await writer.write(enc.encode("Hello, World!"));
Овечкин продлил безголевую серию в составе Вашингтона09:40
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The answer is essentially hardware-level dependency injection. Before calling LD_DESCRIPTOR, the caller saves its desired test constant into a hardware latch using a micro-op called PTSAV (Protection Save). Within LD_DESCRIPTOR, another micro-op called PTOVRR (Protection Override) retrieves and fires the saved test.
The performance characteristics are attractive with incredibly fast cold starts and minimal memory overhead. But the practical limitation is language support. You cannot run arbitrary Python scripts in WASM today without compiling the Python interpreter itself to WASM along with all its C extensions. For sandboxing arbitrary code in arbitrary languages, WASM is not yet viable. For sandboxing code you control the toolchain for, it is excellent. I am, however, quite curious if there is a future for WASM in general-purpose sandboxing. Browsers have spent decades solving a similar problem of executing untrusted code safely, and porting those architectural learnings to backend infrastructure feels like a natural evolution.